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VIVIENNE BENNETT* & LAWRENCE A. HERZOG**

U.S.-Mexico Borderland Water
Conflicts and Institutional Change: A
Commentary
ABSTRACT

This commentary describesand analyzes importantareasof change
in the politics of water along the U.S.-Mexico border. First, it
focuses on the broader nature of the border region as a way of
framing the discussion of water. It then addresses the matter of
waterpolicy itself. The commentary provides an overview of recent
changes in Mexican water institutions,as well as an overview of
new bilateraland trilateralwater management agencies and other
recent developments in border management. It discusses how each
of the threearticlesin this section of the Journal,"BorderlandWater
Conflicts and InstitutionalChange," contributesto thinkingabout
the complexities of watermanagement along the border.The article
by Wilder demonstrates the scope and the limitations of the
Commissionfor Environmental Cooperation,while the articles by
Michel and by Brown and Mumme suggest new organizational
frameworks for addressingconflicts over water management along
the border.
INTRODUCTION
The U.S.-Mexico borderland embraces a semi-arid zone of deserts,
plains, mountains, and river basins. The essential, defining geographic
characteristic of the borderland is its aridity-the scarcity of water. The
region has but two main hydrological lifelines: the Rio Grande and the
Colorado River, with the latter providing the main water source for the
growing borderland population.
Nested within the fragile borderland ecosystem lies a burgeoning
population of city dwellers spreading out across the landscape in the form
of small, medium, and large cities. Some 12 million people live in the
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counties and border municipios, and another 20 million reside within
functionally connected regions of the larger states surrounding the
boundary line. These substantial and growing populations can neither
sustain their economic bases, nor physically survive, without water.
Conversely, the current water supply will not easily serve the projected
numbers of in-migrants or the new populations created by natural growth.
Demographers predict that by the year 2020 the combined populations of
U.S. border counties and Mexican municipios could be as high as 24 million,
thus doubling the current size.'
The hydrologic ecosystem sprawls across the international
boundary between Mexico and the United States creating one of the most
challenging regional water management problems in the world.
Traditionally all boundary water resources, including groundwater, were
formally managed by the International Boundary and Water Commission
(IBWC), the longest operating environmental management agency along the
border. The 1BWC's creation attests to the fact that, as early as 1944,
boundary water extraction needed to be regulated by a formal binational
authority. However, as many scholars have noted, the IBWC was not
mandated to deal with all the conflicts now facing water supply in the
borderland, including toxic waste dumping, sewage spills, pesticide
contamination, conflicts over groundwater, and the politics of scarce water
policy among competing users-farmers, tourism developers, industrialists,
residents, and different levels of government.2 This competition is becoming
especially fierce in the most urbanized sub-regions, including San
Diego-Tijuana ' and El Paso-Ciudad JuArez, but will be significantly played
out in rural settlements that eventually compete with urban regions over
scarce and fragile water resources.
The truth is that the management of water in the U.S.-Mexico
borderland has become a much more complex problem than the creators of
the IBWC could ever have imagined. The three articles in this section begin
the important process of studying key trends and issues for the new
millennium and analyzing important areas of change in the politics of water
along the U.S.-Mexico border. Our commentary synthesizes some of the
vital themes and questions raised in this important new body of inquiry.
We begin by focusing on the broader nature of the border region as a way

1. See Paul Canster et aL, Overview-Findings of Border Institute I, in THE U.S.-MEuXco
BORDER ENVIRONMENT. A ROAD MAP TO A SUSTAINABLE 2020, at 1, 1-2 (S.W. Ctr. for Envtl.
Research & Policy Monograph Series No. 1,Paul Ganster ed., 2000).
2. See generally TOM BARRY & BETH SIMS, THE CHALLENGES OF CROSS BORDER
EN
NMNTALISM (1994).
3. See generally THE U.S.-MEXCO BORDFRENVIRONMEwr A ROADMAP TO ASUSTAINABLE
2020, supra note 1; SUSTAINABLE DEvELOPMENr INSAN DIEGO-TIJUANA (Mark Spalding ed.,
1999).
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of framing the discussion of water. We then address the matter of water
policy itself.
Globalization and the New Political Geography of Eco-Regions
Water management must be viewed in the context of changing
territorial organization in the era of globalization. Prior to the middle of the
twentieth century, international boundaries were viewed as buffer zones
between nation states-defended edges to be fortified with military
infrastructure but carefully avoided as places of production, development,
and settlement. Indeed, most of the great cities of the world remained
purposefully lodged in their nations' interiors, far from the uncertainties of
the international boundary. Since 1950, the scale of national defense has
shifted away from land boundaries. Meanwhile, new technologies have led
to the globalization of markets, communication, and transportation, and
have profoundly changed the way nations organize their territory and
understand ecosystems. As the new millenium dawns, we live in,
territorially speaking, a very different world, one in which international
boundaries pose enormous new opportunities for resource development,
production, and urban growth. These opportunities also carry vast new
responsibilities for managing ecosystems that transcend international
boundaries. 4
Thus, in a globalizing society, nation states are no longer airtight,
closed systems within which all human activity is sealed. The world has
become a patchwork of different spatial actors-national governments,
global corporations, common markets, etc., all operating at a variety of
scales across nation-state boundaries. Indeed, the concept of "sustainability"
is grounded in equity and social justice, but also in transfrontier
responsibility.' The nation-state boundary has faded; world ecology now
operates within a set of transfrontier parameters.
At the regional level, therefore, nation states must rethink how they
manage their shared frontier regions under the new conditions of
globalization. Transfrontier responsibility has become a crucial foreign
policy framework for nations like the United States and Mexico, who share
not only a nearly 2,000 mile long political frontier, but a growing set of
cross-border interactive circuits-trade, cross-border labor migration, global
manufacturing systems, water, air, and land.

4.

See generally SHARED SPACE: RETHINKING THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER ENVIRONMENT

(Lawrence A. Herzog ed., 2000).
5. Seegenera/lyGRAHAMHAUGH1ON&COUNHUNTERSUSTAINABLECUES (Reg'l Studies

Ass'n Regi Policy & Dev. Series No. 7,1994).
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We now recognize the rise of a new prototype of global regionalism
in the next century, called the "transfrontier ecosystem," 6where eco-regions
housing millions of inhabitants sprawl across international boundaries,
most notably in Western Europe and North America. Heavily populated
European transfrontier regions can be found on the Swiss-French-German
border, the Dutch-German-Belgian border, the Swiss-French border near
Geneva, and the French-Germanborder near Strasbourg. In North America,
one finds such transfrontier regions along the U.S.-Canada and, of course,
along the U.S.-Mexico border. In all of these regions water management
and environmental planning are being reinvented.
The Challenge of Cooperation in a Cross-Border Ecosystem
One of the more difficult elements in cross-border resource
planning lies in the area of institutional cooperation. Institutional
cooperation normally occurs on two levels: formal and informal! Formal
cooperation involves agreements between nation states in the form of
treaties, presidential meetings with memoranda of agreement, or
interparliamentary negotiations. Formal accords can lead to permanent
cross-border institutions, including decision-making bodies either with
jurisdictional or advisory status. Informal accords include regular meetings
among local and higher government authorities, as well as non-binding
agreements to cooperate on local matters ranging from criminal justice,
pollution control, and firefighting to traffic management. Both formal
institutions (suchas the Commission for Environmental Cooperation [CEC],
the Border Environment Cooperation Commission [BECC], etc.) and
informal institutions (such as border water councils, non-governmental
organizations [NGOs], etc.) are apparent in the political landscape of water
management along the U.S.-Mexico border. This raises two key questions.
What combination of institutions will work best? And, what set of
enforcement/implementing authorities must exist in order for formal and
informal institutions to be effective rather than just window-dressing?
Cross-Border Cooperation in Western Europe
One of the more popular examples of successful cross-border
cooperation, which combines both formal and informal agreement, is

6.

See LAWREN CE A. HERZOG, WHRE NORTH MM SoUTH 189 (1990).

7. SeegenerallyPLANNINGTHEINTERNATIONALBORDERM
ed., 1986).

OPOUS (Lawrence A. Herzog
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transfrontier planning in Western Europe! Anchored by the European
Community, and its social parliamentary cousin, the Council of Europe, this
region is blessed with a number of attributes that facilitate transborder
cooperation: geographic proximity and historically integrated border
regions, a common fate in economy and defense that tends to tie nations
together, and relatively similar economic levels across nation state
boundaries. This relative homogeneity and sense of common cause has been
partly responsible for the proliferation of transfrontier planning programs
beginning more than two decades ago.
Especially notable have been cross-border programs of
environmental cooperation and economic development along the SwissGerman-French, Swiss-Italian, French-Belgian, Dutch-German-Belgian,
Spanish-French, and other European borders. Most of these programs have
involved a combination of formal agreements between national
governments, often negotiated in the Council of Europe, and informal
arrangements across borders between officials and private entrepreneurs
who are familiar with one another.
Perhaps the most important and successful example of European
transfrontier planning is the Regio-Basiliensis, a regional planning entity in
the Swiss-German-French border region near Basel, Switzerland.0 More
than two million people live in the tri-national urbanized region
surrounding the city of Basel. By 1975, Swiss, French, and German
authorities had formally joined in creating a Commission of eight members,
with all members appointed by the foreign ministries of the three nations.
Regional committees were set up to represent the two ecological subregions: the north and south Upper Rhine River areas. Further, a number
of smaller, informal committees were set up, including the Upper Rhine
Regional Planners.
The Commission and the various regional and informal working
committees meet regularly throughout the year. They address several basic
planning problems in the region, including the environment. The RegioBasiliensis, which has become the planning arm of the Commission, has
sought to address the difficult problem of nuclear power and water
contamination. Before the Regio came into existence, the three nations were
concentrating too many nuclear plants in this border region, and they
would all need to utilize the Rhine river for cooling, causing irreversible
ecological problems for the river. Tri-national planning and coordination

8. See generally Lawrence A. Herzog, International Boundary Cities; The Debate on
TransfrontierPlanningin Twoo BorderRegions 31 NAT. RESOURCESJ .587 (1991).
9. See generally id.
10. See generally Hans Briner, Regional Planning and Tranrfrontier Cooperation: The

Region Basiliensis, in ACROSS BOUNDARizS 45-53. (Oscar J.Martinez ed., 1986).
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allowed the local governments to demonstrate the long-term dangers of this
trend. The result is that policy changes were put into place by the three
nations through the Council of Europe. The changes involved limiting the
location of new plants in the region."
Regional leaders in the Swiss-German-French borders will tell you
that coordination is easier to achieve at the local level than it is at the
national level, and that is one of the great advantages of informal crossborder coordination. It brings nations together over common interests
(environment, economy, etc.). The spirit of cooperation in this case is
enhanced by the progressive leadership in the Council of Europe, where
transborder concerns are given a high priority.
The U.S.-Mexico Border Region
The U.S.-Mexico border region brings together not only a plethora
of government agencies at the federal, state, and local levels, but also two
very different cultures with distinct values and philosophies about cities,
land development, the environment, and politics. Equally important, the
border brings together nations at very different stages of economic
development. The United States is a world economic power, while Mexico
is an industrializing nation with a long history of economic dependence on
the United States. At the border, Mexico's dependence is underscored by
the two most important border phenomena of our times: immigration and
assembly plants (maquiladoras). Both are driven by the opportunities the
border created, either for undocumented workers crossing to the north, or
for cheap labor enclaves along the Mexican side of the border that bring
multi-national capital to the region. One must always be aware of these
basic economic
asymmetries that lie at the core of U.S.-Mexico border
12
relations.
Further, both the United States and Mexico have dramatically
different forms of government and notions of politics. As a result, public
officials have different perceptions of politics and different priorities. The
example of a 1980s political survey of local officials on the California border
reveals how cultural differences affect local management. Mexican and U.S.
officials expressed divergent concerns over management of the same
region-the San Diego-Tijuana urban area. Quality of life and image

11.

See id.

12. See generallyHERZOG,supranote 6; LAWRENCEA. HERZOG, FROMAZTEC To HIGH TECH:
ARcHnEUR AND LANDSCAPE ACROSS THE MEXICO-UNITED STATES BORDER (1999).
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concerned U.S. policy makers, while economic and infrastructure

development were the higher priorities for their Mexican counterparts."3

More recent studies have suggested a number of general and
specific barriers to cooperation. General barriers might include language,
culture, initiative, and politics.14 Even when officials do actually speak both
languages of the border, there are still problems in understanding the
nuances of meaning and tone in face-to-face interaction. Mexican officials
have expressed the opinion that their U.S. counterparts do not really
understand Mexican culture, and this may cause them to cling to a proud
kind of nationalism in dealing across the border. Further, U.S. officials must
always be aware of the differences in power, wealth, and development that
underscore U.S.-Mexico relations. These differences have in the past led to
what many observers called a lack of initiative on both sides in moving
beyond informal discussions to real policy making.
Still the biggest differences remain in the area of power, politics,
and governance."5 The United States has traditionally been the more
decentralized government. Now Mexico is rapidly moving toward
devolution of power to states and municipalities, although this process will
take several decades to complete. In government, the United States has
favored a civil service, merit-driven organization of managers, while in
Mexico the management system was more tied to political affiliations. This
too will soon change in the post-NAFTA era and with the inauguration of
President Vicente Fox in December 2000, the first president not from the
PAN, Partidode Accion Nacional,since the 1920s. Meanwhile, both nations
have vastly dissimilar legal systems, with the U.S. system derived from
British common law, and the Mexican one from Napoleonic codes. The
countries' actual laws vary in terms of individual rights, property, land use
law, business law, etc. Notions of private rights and "public interest," vital
to such areas as land use, property, and environmental law remain distinct
on either side of the border.
Political Responses to Border Environmental Problems
Water conflicts arise along the border for multiple reasons. Rivers,
aquifers, and watersheds straddle and traverse the border independent of
the boundary line. As a result, issues of water usage, availability, and
13. See Lawrence A. Herzog, CrossBorderPlanningand Cooperation,in THE U.S.-MEXICAN
BORDER ENviRONMEN. A ROADMAP IT ASUSTAINABLE 2020, supra note 1, at 149.
14. See generallyMichelle A. Saint-Germaine, Problems and Opportunities for Cooperation
Among Public Managers on the U.S.-Mexico Border, (unpublished paper presented at the
Southwestern Social Science Association Meetings, Mar. 30 to Apr. 2,1994, on file with author).
15. See generally HiRzOC, supra note 6; JOHN WILLIAM HOUSE, FRONTIER ON THE Rio

GRANDE (1982).
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quality do not stop at the border. Water management issues along the
border can be separated into two types. The first is quantity or allocational
conflicts. For example, a serious dispute over water allocation between
urban users in Nuevo Le6n and agricultural users in Tamaulipas pitted the
two Mexican states against one another in a vicious political battle" that
was in part due to outdated water apportionment formulas dictated by the
1944 "Treaty Between the United States and Mexico Regarding the
Utilization of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Waters of the Rio
Grande." In a second example of an allocational conflict, a plan to line the
All-American Canal in Arizona would increase water availability for U.S.
users while robbing Mexican border farmers of water they have been
getting via seepage out of the unlined canal.
The second type of transborder water issue is quality or
environmental protection conflicts. One example of a water quality conflict
is the negative impact of the increasing salinization of Colorado River water
(as it progresses southward in the United States) for Mexican farmers who
can no longer use the polluted water for irrigation. A second example is
found in Tijuana's inadequate water treatment facilities and sewerage
capacity, leading to Tijuana sewage spills being carried into San Diego by
the binational
Tijuana River and discharged into the Pacific Ocean at San
17
Diego.
Thus, just as rivers, aquifers, and watersheds cross the border, so
do water-related problems. And so, therefore, must the resolution of those
problems. Water problems that may seem localized on one side of the
border turn out to have binational implications and require transfrontier
solutions. Problem solving has, therefore, come to involve municipal, state,
and federal agencies within Mexico and the United States, as well as new
binational/trilateral environmental agencies. During the 1990s, there were
significant changes in the institutional framework within which crossborder environmental problems are addressed. These changes occurred
primarily on two levels: within Mexico itself, and on the binational and
trilateral level with new agencies created jointly by the United States and
Mexico, and by the United States, Mexico, and Canada.

16. See generallyHoward Harry Donnell, The Politics of Water Provision in Northeastern
Mexico, 1989-1996, at 105-09 (1997) (unpublished Master's thesis report, University of Texas
(Austin)) (on file with author); Stephen Mumme, Managing Acute Water Scarcity on the
U.S.-.Mexico Border; InstitutionalIssues Raised by the 1990s Drought, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 149
(1999).
17. SeegenerallyLoriSaldafka, Tijuana'sToxic Waste, NACLA REP.ONAM., Nov.-Dec. 1999,
at 31.
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Institutional Changes in Mexico
In the last decade, Mexico has engaged in a deep restructuring of

its water management bureaucracy along with the most significant revision
of the regulatory framework for water management since the 1917

Constitution was written. In 1989, a new federal water commission,
Comisi6n Nacional de Aguas (CNA), was created both to provide and to
regulate water use in Mexico (the CNA is a decentralized institution under
the Secretariat of Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries). In
addition, the National Water Law (Ley de Aguas Nacionales),which lays out
the legal framework for all water usage and hence all water policy in
Mexico, was substantially revised. The new law, effective December 1992,
for the first time set the basis for market mechanisms for circulating water
rights. It conceptualizes the consumer as a customer acting within a context
of economic rationality, rather than as a citizen with a fundamental right to
water.
New Bilateral and Trilateral Agencies
Simultaneous to the changes within Mexico, the bilateral and
trilateral framework for addressing environmental issues that involve
Mexico, the United States, and Canada has also changed dramatically. Most
significant has been the creation of four new transborder institutions in
response to the environmental provisions of NAFTA. The purpose of these
new agencies is to facilitate cooperation between the United States, Mexico,
and Canada on water, wastewater, and other environmental issues of
concern.
1. The Border XXI Framework
The Border XXI Framework, which expands on the La Paz
Agreement of 1983 and the Integrated Border Environment Plan of 1992, is
a binational effort between the United States and Mexico to engage in
sustainable socio-economic development while protecting the environment.
Border XXI operates mainly on the federal level, with five-year plans for the
border environment that are supposed to stress public involvement,
decentralization, and improved communication. To date, the strategy of
improved communication has been somewhat successful; however, Border
XXI has not yet succeeded in fostering greater public participation among
local or state institutions.18

18. See MarkJ. Spakiing, The NAFTA EnvironmentalInstitutionsandSustainable Development
on the U.S.-Mexico Border, in SHARED SPACE: RETHINKING THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 4, at 75,89.
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2. The Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) and the North
American Development Bank (NADBank)
The BECC was created in November 1993 to "assist local
communities and other sponsors in developing and implementing
environmental infrastructure projects, and to certify projects for financing
consideration by the NADBank or other sources....The NADBank is
capitalized in equal shares by the United States and Mexico..."" Both BECC
and NADBank address environmental problems specifically along the
U.S.-Mexico border.
The BECC/NADBank structure constitutes a new approach to
dealing with localized border environmental problems. First, because the
NADBank is financed in equal parts by the United States and Mexico, and
because the countries have equal votes in both agencies, the stage is set for
more balanced power sharing in the decision-making process. Second, the
public works that BECC/NADBank are intended to support have an
explicit goal of improving the quality of life in poor communities while also
supporting infrastructure to help reduce poverty. While BECC/NADBank
have done a lot to foster public participation, they tend to operate on a
narrow project-by-project basis without a long-term perspective. In
addition, the funding for the NADBank and for BECC-certified projects has
fallen short of expectations along the border. It appears that these two
agencies do not yet have the wholehearted support of the U.S. and Mexican
governments.
3. The Commissionfor Environmental Cooperation (CEC)
The CEC was created in 1994 as part of the overall NAFTA package,
as a trilateral agency to develop a long term approach "to address regional
environmental concerns, help prevent potential trade and environmental
conflicts, and promote effective enforcement of environmental law." 21 The
article by Wilder in this section of the Journalis a case study of the CEC in
action. It also provides an example of the second type of water conflict
described above: water quality and environmental protection conflict. In
1996, poor farmers in the Magdalena River Valley in northern Sonora were
refused planting permits by the National Water Commission in Mexico
because the water they used for irrigation had become too contaminated by
municipal sewage to be used on crops. In a remarkable example of the

19. See id. at 92.
20. See id. at 92-93; Stephen P. Mumme, Sustainable Development and Environmental
Decentralization on the Border: Insights from Sonora, in SHARED SPACE: RETHINKING THE
U.S.-MNIsCo BORDER ENVIRONMENT, supra note 4, at 101, 104.

21. See Spalding, supra note 18, at 90.
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globalization of environmental politics, the farmers eventually submitted
a complaint to the CEC citing the Mexican government for its failure to treat
municipal wastewater in conformance with Mexican law before the
wastewater was discharged into the Magdalena River. What is remarkable
about this action is that the existence of the CEC allowed poor peasant
farmers to bypass traditional, ineffective channels of complaint within the
Mexican governmentbureaucracy itself, and take their case to a presumably
neutral, non-corrupt, and non-Mexican agency. With the new CEC structure
in place, poor farmers can legitimately create themselves as the plaintiffs in
a case against the government.
Wilder's case study also provides evidence that the CEC structure,
headquartered in Montreal, may reach to the lowest level of its presumed
constituents. The CEC requested a response to the complaint from the
Mexican government. The government's three tiered response first claimed
that the complaint itself was invalid because the problem predated the
period that the CEC is allowed to address; next the government claimed
that it was budgeting funds to address the problem; and finally, it claimed
to have insufficient resources to fully restore the water quality of the
Magdalena River.
However, once the case was accepted by the CEC, the two parties
to the complaint were certainly not on equal footing. The Mexican
government was in a far stronger position to defend itself than the peasants
were to pursuejustice. In proceeding through the CEC process, the Mexican
government benefits from availability of legal, financial, and human
resources, while the peasants, of course, have no resources. The government
also benefits from the lines of communication that exist because it holds one
of the three commissioner positions on the CEC (not to mention that the
peasants don't even all have telephones, let alone computers and access to
the CEC website...). When the federal government of Mexico, the United
States, or Canada is named in a complaint to the CEC, it has an automatic
advantage because the CEC represents the federal governments of the three
countries.
This is not to say that a complaint cannot be resolved in favor of the
complainant. It is to say that the lower the level of the complainant, the
more disadvantageous the process is for the complainant. There are no
structures in place (such as legal support, on-site assessment, on-going
support services, etc.) to redress this imbalance. As Wilder points out, there
is reason to think that the CEC could terminate the case without further
action, leaving the Magdalena River farmers no better off than when they
filed the complaint.
On the one hand, the existence of a trilateral agency such as the
CEC changes state-society relations in each of the participating nations
because it provides citizens with a new venue for taking on their respective
governments. On the other hand, unless the resource imbalance can be

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

addressed, it will be extremely difficult for grassroots groups to successfully
follow through on any complaints they lodge with the CEC. The CEC
should consider developing a support system to allow for fair use of its
complaint process by all constituents.
Other Recent Developments in Border Management that Could Impact
Water Politics
1. Innovative Public Sector Border Alliances
Many experts recognize that border decision making has not
functioned well when it is either restricted to foreign policy circles at
national levels or informal dialogue at the local level. Recently, concerned
policy makers have searched for a balanced mechanism that brings together
various institutional levels into cross-border alliances, with an emphasis on
self-government, economic development, and border management. Several
examples can be cited; not all examples involve water policy, but they give
evidence of new ways of thinking about all transborder policymaking.
a. Border Liaison Mechanism (BLM) is a product of the U.S. State
Department, and seeks to bring local, state, and federal officials from both
sides of the border together to deal with common border problems.
Through a series of task forces, key officials engage in frank discussions and
seek to integrate their dialogue into the larger formal decision-making
processes.
b. ConsultativeMechanism is a Mexican initiative that brings Mexican
consuls in U.S. border cities together with local officials. The idea is to get
federal officials together with local and regional actors.
c. State Alliances are agreements between bordering U.S. and
Mexican states to commit to long-term economic development by creating
a binational regional strategic plan at the twin-state level.
d. The U.S.-Mexico Border Counties Coalitionwas created in 1998 by
the 24 border counties on the U.S. side as a way of increasing their political
visibility and effectiveness in getting the attention of higher governments
to address border issues. The counties wanted a unified voice nationally to
address the varied and growing list of problems within their
jurisdiction-including indigent health care, housing illegal border crossers,
fire suppression, criminal justice costs, and "patient dumping" by federal
agents (border patrol) into county health care facilities. The idea is to get all
of the counties working together to create good border policy making. This
group has not yet brought in its county partners on the Mexican side, but
the idea is promising.
e. Empowerment Zones. The Clinton Administration continues to
promote the idea of creating poles of development in less advantaged areas
of the United States, and supporting these with federal monies to
strategically jolt the local economy. Vice President Gore's office declared the
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Lower Rio Grande Valley as an empowerment zone in 1998, with some $40
million being directed toward long-term regional economic development
planning. Probably the biggest contribution the empowerment zones can
make is in addressing the huge problem of border colonias, unplanned
construction of makeshift homes, often without services, in rural zones on
the edges of metropolitan areas in Texas and New Mexico, as well as more
sporadically in California and Arizona.
f. Councilsof Government (COG) are coalitions of border counties on
the U.S. side of the border that band together to address regional planning
issues. An example would be the Lower Rio Grande Development Council,
which seeks to create a master plan for the lower Rio Grande region.
2. Local Border Planning
In general, on both sides of the border there have been
developments toward strengthening local and community-based planning.
In the United States, community planning boards now have more power
than ever before. Communities are learning to align themselves with NGOs
to protect their environment and quality of life. In Mexico, the political
transition toward democracy and decentralization of power is
strengthening municipal government, giving communities more voice
along the border. Formal examples of local border planning include the
following:
a. Twin-city cross-border plans. For a variety of reasons (such as
history, geography, politics), some twin city regions have managed to create
better cross-border liaisons than others. Laredo-Nuevo Laredo on the Texas
border, for example, is known for its strong local planning history, which
includes the creation of a recent Binational Environmental Management
Plan.'
b. Instituto Municipalde Investigacion y Planeacion(RAP in Ciudad
Juarez, INPlan in Tijuana). Mexico has a long history of centralized urban
planning and administration. Local governments have traditionally been
weak and underfunded, while the power over municipal planning and
financing of infrastructure lie at the state and federal levels. Since the early
1990s, Mexico has been rapidly moving toward a decentralized political
system, with the power to tax and spend shifted to municipal governments.
The creation of IMIPs and IMPlans represents an attempt to have
independent city planning agencies that function without direct connection
to the political party that controls the local and state government. These
agencies receive their own funding and carry out research and planning

22. See generally Stephen R.Gibson, Binational Planning: Los Dos Laredos (Mar. 12,1998)
(unpublished report, on file with author).
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autonomously. The intention is to link their planning decisions to municipal
law.
c. Community-basedecology. Many communities are controlling their
destiny by organizing locally based environmental planning entities. For
example, The Sonoran Institute, which became the Udall Center in 1998, is
an example of a small initiative linked to The University of Arizona that
promotes community response to the environment. It is involved in projects
that include repair of riparian ecosystems, development of ecotourism
programs, and community workshops in rural areas.
d. BinationalWatershedCouncils. The article by Brown and Mumme
in this section of the Journal explores the potential of binational watershed
councils to handle issues of water allocation and quality arising within
binational watersheds. The idea of a watershed council comes from la Ley
de Aguas Nacionales, the Mexican National Water Law of 1992, which
stipulates the formation of watershed councils for every watershed in
Mexico wherein all water users within a watershed would have a voice.
Brown and Mumme explore the usefulness of developing such
councils for binational watersheds. As they point out, the Mexican councils
have some serious flaws. Environmental and water quality concerns are
absent from the watershed council mandate. It is not clear that true public
participation is encouraged. In addition, Brown and Mumme assert that
"creation of a binational [council] would require considerable changes in
position, boundary, scope and authority rules at the top most policy level
where these organizations would be created.. .as well as major changes of
rules at the implementation and operational level." Brown and Mumme
explore the Border Water Council (BWC) for Tijuana/San Diego, created in
1997, as an instance of a binational watershed council. While the BWC can
be considered a de facto binational watershed council-it addresses water
management issues within a binational watershed-it does not address
environmental and water quality issues, it is not effective at including
public participation, and most importantly, it was not conceptualized as a
watershedcouncil but as a water council. The BWC, as described by Brown
and Mumme, is not really a model of a binational watershed council, but a
precursor. Brown and Mumme signal a number of barriers to the formation
of binational watershed councils along the border, and regional planners
would be wise to address these barriers explicitly.
3. Hydrocommons-basedgovernance
The article by Michel in this section of the Journal suggests a
hydrocommons approach to water quality management along the border
based on a theoretical concept that defines the problem region and the
solution region for a water management issue. The usefulness of this new
approach lies in its conceptualization of the geographical region that a
water quality problem encompasses, and the subsequent definition of key
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players in the problem-solving process based on the level of administrative
aggregation. Hydrocommons governance recognizes the linkages between
the region that exports water and the region that imports it. Furthermore,
a hydrocommons approach recognizes that water transfers can cause
environmental problems in both the exporting and importing regions, and
that these problems are linked. In consequence, solutions must be
broadened to encompass both the importing and exporting regions.
Successful water quality management then involves local and state agencies
in both regions, the public in both regions, environmental groups in both
regions, and so on.
Michel discusses the CALFED hydrocommons process in Northern
California and concludes by suggesting that such a process be considered
for the U.S.-Mexico border region. How would a hydrocommons approach
differ from all the existing structures and processes? First, adopting a
hydrocommons approach means making explicit the understanding that
water quality problems will not be satisfactorily resolved unless a wider
range of actors is involved in the solution process. CALFED is making a
deep attempt at managing a very unwieldy process, one with many actors
at the table and many players competing for voice. The benefits to
broadening the problem-shed are better solutions that last into the longterm, with buy-in from all affected parties.
There is at present no hydrocommons type of approach to water
management in the border region. However, there are pieces in place. Many
of the existing agencies and smaller cross-border initiatives can serve as
precursors to a hydrocommons governance structure because they already
bring together key local, state, and federal government actors. What is
missing is greater participation by the public and by environmental groups.
A regional hydrocommons authority could bring together the currently
fragmented pieces and organize them under one overarching structure.
Needless to say, the hydrocommons would not be the whole border itself.
Instead, hydrocommons would be identified for each major water-related
problem, and hydrocommons governance would be developed as
appropriate for each problem. Of course, hydrocommons would ultimately
be transfrontier organizations, thus facing many of the cultural and political
obstacles discussed earlier in this commentary.
CONCLUSION
The challenge of borderland water management is partly about
geography, but mostly about power and politics. Notwithstanding the
"harmonious" future implied by NAFTA, the U.S.-Mexico border region
continues to embrace a landscape of environmental conflict.
However, one can find international examples of binational
cooperation. The Swiss-German-French case reviewed earlier in this

988

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

commentary suggests that cooperation may be easier to achieve at the local
level than at the national level. Certainly, the work of both Michel and of
Brown and Mumme argues for the power of local/regional cooperation.
The work of Wilder raises serious questions about the ability of trilateral
agencies like the CEC, which operate at the international and national
levels, to represent their constituents at the local level, and to effectively
address and resolve grassroots water problems. At the same time, we must
underscore that Switzerland, Germany, and France do not face the
asymmetries faced by the United States and Mexico. Cooperation along the
U.S.-Mexico border must overcome the obstacles of two different cultures,
two different political systems, two different legal systems, and two
different levels of economic development. In the face of such differences it
is perhaps remarkable that the many instances of cooperation described in
this commentary actually exist.

